Bounded lifetime
Certificates contain an expiry and are rejected outside their validity window.
For optional human SSO, Safe Boundary issues a client certificate with a bounded lifetime. The proxy rejects expired or revoked certificates and can cancel active sessions by serial number.
Why this exists
The implemented mechanism is a short-lived, identity-bearing certificate for a human proxy session. It gives operators a concrete session credential to expire and revoke.
This is not a generic just-in-time authorization system. Safe Boundary does not currently advertise approval workflows, arbitrary row or table grants, or temporary per-operation privilege elevation.
What it does
Certificates contain an expiry and are rejected outside their validity window.
A serial can be added to the revocation store and refused on subsequent connections.
Active sessions associated with a certificate serial can be force-disconnected.
Session lifecycle
| Decision | Issue | During session | End access |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certificate | Short-lived identity-bearing certificate | Proxy validates CA, purpose, and validity | Expiry rejects later connections |
| Operator response | Record serial and subject | Monitor active session | Revoke serial or cancel matching active session |
How it works
Complete SAML or OIDC authentication.
Create a client certificate with the configured lifetime.
Use the certificate on the PostgreSQL proxy TLS session.
Finish access through expiry, revocation, or session cancellation.
Protected when
Important boundaries
Continue the story
See the complete SAML/OIDC and mTLS flow.
Understand trust boundaries, credentials, identity, and bypass conditions.
Record policy outcomes and the identity information each surface can establish.
Start in observe mode and validate the policy against representative traffic before you enforce it. That gives the team evidence for each decision, along with explicit bypass controls for the cases that need a deliberate exception.